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I. The need for self-regulation
In implementing its objectives, modern environmental law primarily em­
ploys regulatory strategies (command-and-control regulation), although there 
has always been a certain mix with other instruments such as subsidies, taxes, 
information, negotiation and moral suasion. This pattern of regulation has 
been favoured for various reasons. One reason for the predominance of ad­
ministrative regulation is the tradition of police law which is the source of 
modern environmental law. Furthermore, administrative regulation is 
deemed to be effective, i.e. to ensure that the environmental quality goals are 
met. Finally it provides for participation of the public, transparency of 
agency decisions and political accountability of administrators; hence, admin­
istrative regulation embodies both legitimacy and a certain democratic 
element.
However, in recent years command-and-control regulation has to an ever 
increasing extent been criticised on the grounds that it is inefficient due to its 
neglect of individual costs of pollution control and prevention, hampers inno­
vation, and, as a result of implementation and enforcement deficits that are 
inherent in this type of regulation, does not even achieve its environmental 
objectives. In particular, it is felt that administrative regulation is not a suit­
able instrument for implementing the goals of sustainable development - the 
modern paradigm of environmental policy. Also, there is a definite trend in 
public administration from juridical towards instrumental rationality, from 
application of law towards goal-achievement which at least weakens the posi­
tion of law as the primary instrumental means of environmental policy. 
Therefore, a certain tendency towards deregulation of environmental policy 
has emerged, although administrative regulation still is clearly dominant.
The primary means of deregulation offered by critics of administrative 
regulation are economic instruments such as taxes, charges and tradeable 
permits. In the context of global climate policy, CO2 taxes have been intro­
duced in some European countries and are widely discussed in other coun­
tries. However, there still is a large gap between the demands for greater re­
liance on economic instruments and political reality. The introduction of such 
instruments has met with much political resistance; and doubts have been 
raised as to whether economic instruments can really be associated with the 
program of deregulation. Indeed, contrary to the common understanding of 
economists, while economic instruments offer the market participants a rela­




























































































the hierarchical authority of the state and hence, like command-and-control 
regulation, also are instruments of an interventionist environmental policy. 
They require the setting of concrete mandatory environmental protection or 
precaution targets by the state, and they impose on industry obligations to pay 
certain amounts of money or to acquire pollution rights if they want to emit 
waste substances or release harmful products into the environment.
There also are doubts as to whether economic instruments are a suitable, 
generally applicable means of a “proactive” environmental policy which aims 
at a sustainable structure of society1. Since it is not always possible to formu­
late precise, enforceable environmental quality targets, proactive environ­
mental policy must at least to some extent rely on social learning triggered by 
mere guidance as to the general direction of intended change. The need for 
proactive environmental policy lies in the enormous complexity and long­
term nature of modem environmental policy, especially sustainability policy. 
Widespread scientific uncertainty about the existence and extent of risks to the 
environment and the regeneration capacity of natural resources, the complex­
ity of potential adverse impacts of environmental policy measures on industry 
and the labour market, the distributional problems associated with sustain­
ability policies, the need for achieving far-reaching structural change of the 
economy as well as fundamental change in the society’s value system - all 
these factors render instrumental (means-ends) rationality at least problematic 
and suggest proactive environmental policy as an alternative or at least sup­
plement. This is especially true where, as is presently the case almost every­
where in Europe, the ambitious goals of sustainable development are con­
fronted with the challenge of a deep-going economic crisis. Economic instru­
ments may be ideal under the perspective of allocative efficiency. However, 
they may have disruptive effects on the economy and be associated with high 
adjustment costs, especially cause considerable shifts of capital from one eco­
nomic sector to another, promote dislocation of industry to foreign countries 
and increase unemployment. Moreover, economic instruments are not capable 
of steering the behaviour of potential polluters, especially process and prod­
uct innovation, of itself into an environmentally-friendly direction. The mere 
knowledge of potential polluters that in case of later environmental problems 
the state could intervene with regulatory or economic instruments is not a
1 For the notion of proactive environmental policy see V. von Prittwitz, “Gefahrenabwehr 
- Vorsorge - Okologisierung. Drei Idealtypen praventiver Umweltpolitik”, in: U. 
Simonis (ed.), Preventive Umweltpolitik, 1988, p. 49-64; T. O’Riordan, “Anticipatory 
Environmental Policy”, ibidem, p. 65-76; G. Fiilgraff & J. Reiche, “Proaktive 




























































































sufficient incentive for an “efficiency revolution” and other forms of struc­
tural change of the economy needed for achieving sustainability.
Self-regulation is a possible response to deficiencies both of administrative 
regulation and economic instruments2. At first glance, this seems paradoxical. 
There does not seem to be a reason why firms who cannot be caused to be­
have in a sustainable way by administrative regulation or object to the impo­
sition of economic instruments should be willing to change their behaviour 
through voluntary self-regulation. The answer can be found on two levels of 
argument.
In the first place, self-regulation is attractive because it grants firms 
greater flexibility in the timing and design of adjustment measures and allows 
for an equitable distribution of adjustment burdens to participating firms. 
Moreover, the fact that industry is in some way or other also involved in the 
goal-setting process promotes compliance.
Secondly, since “pure”, i.e. strictly autonomous, self-regu-lation runs 
counter to the interests of the relevant actors and is contrary to the logic of a 
market economy, the state exercises a certain degree of influence or even 
pressure towards solving existing or anticipated environmental problems by 
self-regulation. Environmental self-regulation occurs either in the “shadow of 
hierarchical authority”3, i.e. under the threat of adopting administrative or 
economic regulation or as a result of institutional or organisational arrange­
ments set by the state. “Pure” self-regulation is rare. Normally, the state at­
tempts to influence the behaviour of firms by setting indicative environmental 
policy targets and/or it creates an informational or organisational framework 
that is designed to promote a sustainable behaviour of these actors. It is hoped 
- and research on environmental innovations by industry seems to confirm 
this assumption - that in the course of their activities, they of themselves then 
consider the environmental consequences of their behaviour and achieve or 
make use of process or product innovation that reduces environmental degra­
dation and resource consumption. Instead of orders given by the state or the 
pressure of money the state relies on incited consensus, information, and
2 For the following text see E. Rehbinder, “Self-regulation by Industry”, in: G. Winter 
(ed.), European Environmental Law, 1995, p. 239, at 240-242; but also P. Lascoumes 
& J. Valluy, Les activités publiques conventionnelles - un nouvel instrument de politi­
que publique? L'exemple de la protection de l ’environnement industriel, EUI Working 
Papers RSC No. 96/16, 1996, at 2, 4.
3 F. Scharpf, “Positive und negative Koordinierung in Verhandlungssystemen”, in A. 
Héritier (ed.), Policy-Analyse - Kritik und Neuorientierung, PVS-Sonderheft 24/1993, 




























































































organisation. If one stresses the - necessary - framework conditions that make 
environmental self-regulation possible, rather than the resulting act of self­
regulation, one can speak here of “soft” instruments of environmental 
policy4 *.
This analysis is supported by the findings of various schools of political 
and legal science which all state a loss of the hierarchical authority of the state 
and a trend towards establishing multipartite policy networks composed of the 
state and various societal actors. Their function is to use the innovation po­
tential of all participating actors and jointly solve the complex and long-term 
problems of modem society, including the formulation and implementation of 
environmental policy5. This does not mean that hierarchy disappears. The 
state remains a “privileged” actor who represents the public interest and has a 
moderating function. Moreover, it can take recourse to coercion where the 
network process proves to render unsatisfactory results. However, the 
stereotype paradigm of the state as the instance of comprehensive control of 
society and the classical separation of state and society are modified in the 
sense that state action relating to complex and long-term problems of envi­
ronmental policy to an ever increasing extent takes place in the framework of 
relatively stable dehierarchised exchange, bargaining and cooperation sys­
tems6 7. Apart from policy networks there are also mechanisms of “global”, 
less focussed steering of self-regulation by informational and organisational 
intervention, such as the eco-audit scheme or requirements of firms to nomi­
nate environmental officers and directors?. These mechanisms do not aim to 
solve a specific problem, but, rather, promote capacity-building.
The need for some state involvement in the process of self-regulation has 
important implications for its use as an instrument of environmental policy.
4 See W. Rengeling, Das Kooperationsprinzip im Umweltrecht, 1988, p. 3-14.
6 See, e.g. C. Bôhret, “Zur Handlungsfahigkeit des funktionalen Staates der spatkapitali- 
stischen Industriegesellschaft”, in: B. Kohler-Koch (ed.), Staat und Demokratie in 
Deutschland, 1992, p. 116-129; C. Offe, “Die Staatstheorie auf der Suche nach ihrem 
Gegenstand”, 1 Jahrbuch fur Staats- und Verwaltungswissenschaft, p. 309, at 317 
(1987); E.H. Ritter, “Umweltpolitik und Rechtsentwicklung”, 6 Neue Zeitschrift fur  
Verwaltungsrecht 929, at 937 (1987); M. Jânicke, Vom Staatsversagen zur politischen 
Modernisierung, Festschrift Hartwig, 1993, p. 63-77; F. Schuppert, Rückzug des 
Staates?, 48 Die Ôffentliche Verwaltung 761, at 763 (1995).
6 F. Scharpf, “Positive und negative Koordinierung in Verhandlungssystemen”, in A. 
Héritier (ed.), Policy-Analyse - Kritik und Neuorientierung, PVS-Sonderheft 24/1993, 
p. 57-83; R. Mayntz, “Policy-Netzwerke und die Logik von Verhandlungssystemen”, 
ibd. p. 39-56; P. Hassenteufel, “Do Policy Networks Matter?”, in P. Le Galès (ed.), 
Les réseaux de l ’action publique, 1995, p. 91-272.




























































































Self-regulation supplements administrative and economic regulation in that it 
aims to achieve policy objectives that are beyond the reach of, or cannot as 
effectively be achieved by, administrative or economic regulation. It assumes 
the existence of a sophisticated environmental policy, a high level of baseline 
regulation and a sufficient organisation of the environmental administration. 
Where these prerequisites are not met, recourse to self-regulation would be 
quite dangerous.
Self-regulation can avoid frictions in the economic process and thereby ef­
ficiency and innovation losses normally associated with administrative regu­
lation, but to a certain extent also with economic instruments. The price paid 
for this advantage lies in the “exchange model” of self-regulation. Environ­
mental policy objectives may be accomplished to a lesser degree or with 
lesser certainty than (theoretically) expected as a result of administrative or 
even economic regulation; this loss of accuracy of goal achievement is a pos­
sible, although not necessary result of voluntariness whose degree varies ac­
cording to the relevant soft instrument used. Therefore, self-regulation as a 
rule cannot - or at least should not - be used for the prevention of clearly un­
acceptable risk, but, rather, in areas where environmental risks or resource 
consumption below the level of unacceptability shall be reduced for precau­
tionary reasons. However, given the difficulty in delimiting these two types of 
risk, this only is a rule of thumb.
Some authors* deny that self-regulation, especially in the form of envi­
ronmental agreements, constitutes an alternative instrument of environmental 
policy, advancing several arguments for this proposition: Where environmen­
tal agreements are used as a substitute for regulation they involve negotiation 
on targets and hence are not an instrument to achieve targets; they are not 
alternative insofar as they only supplement administrative or economic regu­
lation or, where consensus on an agreement depends on threats of future ad­
ministrative regulation or taxation, there often is no political choice because 
administration or economic regulation fails due to the veto power of interest 
groups; and finally an open balancing of the costs and benefits of 
environmental agreements compared to other instruments does not normally 
take place. The authors suggest that the greater “visibility” of environmental 
agreements may just be a product of new tendencies of social science research




























































































such as neocorporatism, policy network analysis, coalition theory and 
implementation research9 10and has also to do with ideological developments 10.
I am not convinced that these arguments require a fundamental reorienta­
tion of the conventional interpretation of the phenomenon of environmental 
agreements: Negotiation on targets also occurs in the decision-making process 
regarding administrative regulation or ecotaxes; environmental agreements 
which are used for supplementing administrative regulation nevertheless are 
an alternative to concretised rules, while the occurrence of threats with regu­
lation sheds some light on particuliarities of consensual instruments but does 
not vitiate the independent character of environmental agreements as an in­
strument: the reverse argument relating to the lack of a real political choice 
could be applied to any of the competing instruments for denying their qual­
ity as an instrument; and finally, possible deficiencies as to open balancing the 
benefits and disadvantages of public action are not limited to environmental 
agreements.
The following remarks will be limited to a single important instrument of 
self-regulation, namely environmental agreements (in the broadest sense) that 
are used as a substitute, precursor or at least complement for administrative 
regulation.
9 Id., at 28-30.




























































































II. Some facts about environmental agreements 
in the EC member states
1. Occurrence and structure of agreements
Throughout Europe, there is a certain trend towards use of contractual 
techniques of environmental policy, although the extent to which states resort 
to such techniques is quite varied. In the last 15-20 years environmental 
agreements have quite frequently been used as an instrument of environmen­
tal policy in the Netherlands and Germany, to a lesser extent also in Austria 
and Denmark, the other EC member states trailing behind. The agreements 
cover such diverse fields as the reduction of effluents by existing sources, the 
reduction of toxic emissions, the prevention and recycling of waste, the 
phasing out of hazardous substances in products and the export of pesticides.
Following the mandate of the 5th Environmental Action Program, the Eu­
ropean Community has more recently also become active in this field. In 
1995, it commissioned an empirical investigation covering the whole Com­
munity whose purpose was to generate information as to the occurrence and 
structure of, and attitudes of major policy players towards, environmental 
agreements and evaluate their success. This investigation! 1 is the basis of part 
of the following analysis. Relying on the findings of this investigation as well 
as other pertinent information, at the end of November 1996, the Commission 
addressed a Communication on environmental agreements to the Council and 
the European Parliament and one week later issued a Recommendation on 
environmental agreements for implementing directives of the Community!2.
A major problem of delimiting the scope of the investigation and, as later 
events have shown, also of substantive policy towards environmental agree­
ments has been the definition of agreement. Environmental agreements may 
be legally binding on the parties (environmental contracts or covenants). 
They may also - and in practice often are - non-binding contracts or informal 
“gentlemen’s agreements”. In some EC member states, especially Germany 
and also Austria, public authorities even are not a formal party to the agree­
ment. Rather, industry issues a formally unilateral declaration - a “self­
commitment” -, which, however, often is based on the initiative of the state, is
1! Consulting Engineers and Planners, Study on Voluntary Agreements concluded between 
Industry and Public Authorities in the Field of the Environment, Final Report 1997 (not 
yet published).




























































































the product of negotiations between the state and industry and is addressed to, 
and often expressly recognized by the state. Finally, there may be purely in­
ternal self-commitments and codes of practice which are not directly related 
to state action; since they are not an instrument of environmental “policy” 
they are not included here 13. As regards the parties to the agreement, on the 
side of industry, indu-trial associations rather than the membership firms of­
ten conclude the agreement. If the latter do not formally adhere to the agree­
ment, this raises some questions of representation and loyalty and diminishes 
the binding or de facto binding effect of the agreement.
The investigation shows that in Germany, Austria, Belgium, France and the 
United Kingdom non-binding agreements and self-commitments prevail, 
while in the Netherlands and Portugal binding contracts are the rule and in 
Denmark and Sweden both types of agreement are almost evenly used. In 
spite of this quite varied pattern, in its Recommendation on environmental 
agreements 14, the European Commission shows a clear preference for bind­
ing agreements, heavily relying on the recent Dutch example which is very 
close to negotiated rule-making. It is doubtful whether this quite unilateral 
preference for a particular type of environmental agreement is appropriate if 
one envisages using the potential of self-regulation to its fullest extent in all 
EC member states with their different political-administrative cultures and 
different experience in using consensual approaches.
Reliance on environmental agreements in the EC varies considerably from 
country to country. There are countries such as the Netherlands and Germany 
where environmental agreements have become an important complementary 
instrument of environmental policy in the last 15-20 years. In the Nether­
lands, 107 agreements have been inventorised for this period 15. For Ger­
many, the figure is 93. This latter figure represents some double-counting as 
regards the CO2 self-commitment of the German Industry of 1995 and its 
1996 amendment. The 15 and 19 sectoral self-commitments, respectively, that 
have been issued under the umbrella of this comprehensive agreement and its 
amendment and are an integral part of it have been included. The adjusted 1345
13 For an even more detailed taxonomy see P. Lascoumes & J. Valluy, supra note 2, at 6- 
17, who, however, also include non-regulatory agreements and pure (internal) self- 
regulation; see also M. Potier, “Les accords volontaires sur l’environnement”, L ’obser­
vateur de l ’OCDE No. 189, août-septembre 1994, 8, at 19; M. Bulling, “Kooperatives 
Verwaltungshandeln (Vorverhandlungen, Arrangements, Agreements und Vertrage) in 
der Verwaltungspraxis”, 42 Die Offentliche Verwaltung, 277, at 280-281 (1989).
14 Supra note 12.
15 The figure even is too low by at least 7 agreements due to a narrow definition of 




























































































figure would be about 60 self-commitments. Austria (20), Denmark (16), 
Italy (11), Sweden (11) and Portugal (10) form a middle group, while coun­
tries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Spain have less than 10 agree­
ments^. There even is one EC member state, namely Greece, where appar­
ently no environmental agreement has ever been concluded and two other 
member states where the figures are far below 5 (Finland and Ireland).
An explanation for this marked difference is difficult. One factor may be 
the stringency and ambition of national environmental policy. In order to 
achieve further progress behind the background of ambitious precautionary 
and sustainability targets on the one hand, and economic problems on the 
other, these countries take recourse to environmental agreements in order to 
overcome political obstacles and keep momentum in their environmental pol­
icy.
Another factor is the political-administrative culture of a given country, 
especially the degree of legalisation of a given society as well as its basic 
value orientation. In countries that have a legalistic concept of command-and- 
control regulation, emphasise legal accountability of administrators, provide 
for extensive judicial protection of diffuse interests and where the value sys­
tem of society is adversarial, there is less room for contractual instruments of 
environmental policy than in countries where formal rule-of-law thinking 
plays a somewhat less prominent role and the political decision-making pro­
cess is either more technocratic or more consensus-orientedU.
Finally, a firm commitment of a national government to deregulation, ei­
ther for improving the competitive situation of the national industry on the 
world market or for entangling industry in the implementation process, may 
be a contributing factor.
Environmental agreements cover many sectors of environmental policy. 
However, especially recently, product waste-related agreements (batteries, 
end-of-life vehicles, recycling of other product waste) are most frequent,
1  ̂ In the United Kindgom a more generous definition of voluntary agreement would have 
increased this number by about 4-5 agreements. - The Portuguese agreements all relate 
to compliance with existing law.
17 For the relevance of policy styles see D. Vogel, “National Styles of Regulating Environ­
mental Policy in Great Britain and the United States”, 1986; J. Richardson (ed.), Policy 
Styles in Western Europe, 1982. However, the marked difference between the Nether­
lands and the United Kingdom shows that generalisations are difficult. It could well be 





























































































which may be explained by the high complexity of this field and the lack of a 
regulatory tradition. Product-related agreements (phase out, product im­
provement, packaging and labelling) are of almost equal importance. Agree­
ments whose primary purpose is the reduction of emissions from industrial 
facilities play a less prominent role, even if one considers the more recent 
agreements in the field of CO2 reduction and energy efficiency. However, this 
classification is based on the titles of the agreements. It must be qualified to a 
certain extent if one includes secondary effects caused by achieving the 
primary purpose of an environmental agreement; then emission reduction 
would become more important.
Environmental agreements often contain reporting and monitoring provi­
sions. These provisions are a response to a fundamental weakness of at least 
non-binding agreements, but also exist in binding agreements. Although there 
may be a basic trust between public authorities and industry, such require­
ments are considered as indispensible for ensuring that the agreement is ef­
fective and credible and gains sufficient public acceptance. Older and less 
complex agreements often only contain simple reporting requirements. How­
ever, more recent and more complex agreements may provide for sophisti­
cated monitoring accompanied by some verification mechanism.
Freerider provisions are less frequent. They may address problems pre­
sented by internal freeriders, namely firms that - through their membership 
in the contracting association - are indirect parties to the agreement. In this 
case transparency clauses (identifying reporting and monitoring) will often 
suffice to detect such freeriders and deter them from evading the agreement 
(although industry takes the view that these precautionary measures are un­
necessary and only serve to convey credibility of the agreement to the public 
at large). External freeriders, especially importers, may pose more serious 
problems to the functioning of an agreement. However, unless their adher­
ence to the agreement cannot be enforced or otherwise ensured, the partici­
pating firms have a strong market position or can expect a competitive advan­
tage from the agreement (e.g., in case of product improvement) there is no 
easy remedy. In a German agreement concerning solvents in paints and var­
nishes one provided for the exercise of moral suasion (public demands on 
outsiders to comply with the rules established by the agreement). Probably 
negotiation will not lead to agreement if the risks of freerider competition are 





























































































2. Experience in the Netherlands and in Germany
a) The Netherlands
The Netherlands have the most extensive experience with regulatory agree­
ments 18. More than 100 agreements have been concluded beginning in the 
1980s. In the first generation of agreements that started in the second half of 
the 1980s, an ad-hoc approach dominated; the relevant agreements mainly 
concerned particular products. Many of the second generation of agreements 
concluded after the adoption of the First Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP) 
in 1989 concerned sectors of the economy that have been designated as prior­
ity target groups for implementing environmental quality objectives laid 
down in the plan. One basic approach developed in the Environmental Policy 
Plan of 1989 was the idea of “internalisation”; the sectors composing the tar­
get groups should agree with the state on the relevant policy options and 
available means and voluntarily assume a fair share of reducing pollution 
originating with the target group (strategic discussion) and, as a result of this 
discussion, they could formulate their own environmental plans for meeting 
the required goals through self-regulationl9. This explains the growing trends 
towards reliance on environmental agreements in the Netherlands in the 
1990s.
As far as their legal form is concerned, the older agreements were all 
simple gentlemen’s agreements, while more recently a binding contractual 
form has normally been used, although gentlemen’s agreements still exist and 
binding contracts also contain mere declarations of intent. As with the strate­
gic discussions, negotiations on environmental agreements (concluded by the
See J. Peters, “Voluntary Agreements between Government and Industry, The Basic 
Metal Covenant as an Example”, in: J. van Dunnd (ed.). Environmental Contracts and 
Covenants: New Instruments for a Realistic Environmental Policy?, 1993, p. 19-31; J. 
van den Broek, “Covenant and Permit in the Dutch Target Group Consultation”, in: J. 
van Dunn6 (ed.), ibid., p. 33-43; J. Biekart, “Environmental Covenants Between Gov­
ernment and Industry in the Netherlands”, 4 RECIEL 141- 149 (1995); I. Koppen, 
“Regulatory Negotiation in the Netherlands: The Case of Packaging Waste”, in: P. 
Knoepfel (ed.), Losung von Umweltkonflikten durch Verhandlung, 1994, p. 153-169; 
R. Gerits & J. Hinssen, “Environmental Covenant for the Oil and Gas producing Indus­
try: A Valuable Policy Instrument?”, 24 Envt’l Pol. & Law 323-329 (1994); N. 
Koeman, “Bilateral Agreements Between Government and Industry in Dutch Environ­
mental Law”, 2 EELR 174, at 183-184 (1993).
*9 M. Hajer, “Furthering ecological responsibility through “verinnerlijking”: the limits to a 
positive management approach”, in: G. Teubner, L. Farmer & D. Murphy (eds.). Envi­
ronmental Law and Ecological Responsibility, 1994, p. 167, at 174-182; I. Koppen, 




























































































Ministry for Housing, Land-use Planning and the Environment) are subject to 
full participation of the public, especially environmental associations, and the 
Parliament may intervene20. Many of the more recent agreements also com­
prise the stage of individual implementation at firm level via company im­
plementation plans, including provision for translation of the plans into 
permit requirements. To this extent, the Dutch regulatory agreement is a hy­
brid between regulatory and compliance agreement, but also between consen­
sual and regulatory technique.
The agreements mainly concern the reduction of emissions (e.g. VOC, NOx 
and CO2 from power plants, ammonia from cattle breeding), the cleaning up 
of contaminated soil underneath gasoline stations, product phase-out, waste 
policy (recycling of packagings, asbestos and plastics) and energy efficiency 
(so-called long-term agreements concluded by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs providing for 20 % improvement in 2000 compared to 1989).
The more complex agreements also contain control and monitoring mech­
anisms. A “steering group” composed of representatives of government and 
the involved industrial sector is responsible for supervising the performance 
of the participating firms and making proposals for eventual adjustment. The 
firms have to submit to the government annual company reports which state 
the progress made in implementing the company implementation plan. These 
are also open to the public.
An important example of the new generation of environmental agreement 
is the Basic Metals Covenant21. The Basic Metals Covenant was concluded 
between the Foundation for the Primary Metals Industry and the Environ­
ment and the major producers on the one hand, and the competent public au­
thorities, especially the Ministry for Housing, Land-use Planning and the En­
vironment, on the other. It is open to accession by firms that have not signed 
it. It is a binding contract which, however, is not substituted for the applica­
ble legal provisions; rather, the agreement provides that the competent permit 
authorities shall consider its terms in granting and modifying permits. 201
20 I. Koppen, supra note 18, at 162-164; P. Gilhuis, Milieurecht op weg naar de jaren ne- 
gentig, 1989, at 27-29 ; National Environmental Policy Plan Plus 1990, Annex 1, p. 13- 
14. This is not true of agreements concluded by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
21 See J. Biekart, supra note 18, at 145-147; J. Peters, “Voluntary Agreements between 
Government and Industry: The Basic Metal Covenant as an Example”, in J. van Dunné, 




























































































The covenant uses an integrated approach, comprising all major emissions 
(air including CFCs and CO2, water, and soil including historic pollution), 
waste, radiation, noise, odours and industrial safety in the primary metals in­
dustry. It has two different kinds of provisions. The first part together with 
the annex constitutes the “Declaration of Intent” and the “Integral Environ­
mental Target Plan” which sets reduction and to a certain extent quality tar­
gets for the whole industry. The reduction targets (base year 1985) are di­
vided into interim and final targets. The parties commit themselves to achieve 
these targets. In the second place, the agreement contains provisions concern­
ing the “translation” of the targets into requirements for individual firms 
through a “Company Environmental Plan”, setting out the procedure for ne­
gotiating the plans and its minimum contents (status quo, presently used tech­
nology, state of the art, envisaged reductions). In view of the heterogeneous 
structure of the branch consisting of 36 large and medium-sized firms, the 
company plans are negotiated between individual firms and the competent 
authorities. However, the covenant grants the Industry Consultation Commit­
tee, a steering committee composed of representatives of the Primary Metals 
Foundation and the participating ministries, an important role in ensuring the 
compatibility of the company plans with the targets, in particular in seeing to 
it that the sum of the reductions provided in the company plans is equivalent 
to the targets. Moreover, the drafts pf the company plans must be made pub­
lic and are subject to public participation. If the competent authorities agree 
to the company environmental plan they endeavour to consider it in granting 
or modifying permits which means that unless there are cogent reasons to the 
contrary, the company plan will be practically binding. Otherwise, the exist­
ing regulations are applied; the same is true in case of violation of the plan. 
The firms must submit annual reports to the authorities in which they de­
scribe the progress made in achieving the targets set forth in the company 
plan. However, there is no independent verification mechanism.
On the basis of problem areas of a general nature such as economic and 
technological development, newly acquired knowledge and emission profiles 
of firms, the Industry Consultation Commitee may discuss and eventually 
propose adjustments of the Integrated Environmental Target Plan, especially 
in the form of a prolongation of the deadlines. These adjustments require the 
agreement of all parties to the covenant. To this extent the covenant, although 
formally binding, contains elements of a “soft” agreement.
The covenant is criticised on the grounds that, based on the company plans, 
it can be predicted that about 50 percent of the targets for the year 2000 will 




























































































as well as the existing environmental policy of the relevant firm and therefore 
impede a comparative evaluation, the measures provided in the companny 
plans do not adequately reflect recent technology and there often are no 
deadlines set for reaching the targets.
b) Germany
In Germany, “self-commitments” rather than formal agreements are the 
normal form of concerted self-regulation by industry in the field of environ­
mental policy22. Public authorities are not formally involved in these com­
mitments which take the form of unilateral declarations of national branch as­
sociations or the national industry federation and in some cases of individual 
firms. However, these declarations are normally the outcome of intensive dis­
cussions with the competent ministries; more recently, but also sometimes in 
the past, these discussions have taken the form of veritable and long-lasting 
negotiations. Moreover, the declarations are addressed to the relevant public 
bodies, they are recognised by them in an informal way, for instance a press 
release, a press conference of the ministry concerned or correspondance, or 
even flanked by a “lean” regulation. Finally the relevant public bodies exer­
cise a major degree of control over the achievement of the targets set by the 
declaration.
Industry has issued about 60 self-commitments (and some formal agree­
ments) in the field of environmental policy since the early 1980s (excluding 
about 20 purely internal self-commitments that are not addressed to, and not 
recognised by, the relevant authorities). If one included the separate self­
commitments issued in the framework of the self-commitment of the German 
industry on protecting the global climate of 1995 and its amendment of 1996, 
the figures would have to be increased considerably, that is up to more than 
90. The number of self-commitments is relatively high, with major increases 
in the recent years. This has two interrelated reasons. First of all, there is a 
clear political stance of the Federal Government in favour of self-commit­
ments. This stance corresponds to widespread demands by industry which op­
poses both administrative regulation and economic instruments. The other 
reason for the emergence of self-commitments is that in the present stage of 
widespread unemployment and a staggering economy environmental policy 
has a difficult position in conflicts with other policies; one can even say that 2
22 W. Rengeling, supra note 2, at 40-44; cf. E. Bohne, “Absprachen zwischen Industrie 
und Regierung in der Umweltpolitik”, 8 Jahrbuch fiir Rechtssoziologie und Rechts- 
theorie 266, at 283 (1982); id., “Informales Verwaltungs- und Regierungshandeln als 




























































































the wind blows into the face of environmental policy. Self-commitments are 
considered as a way out of the impasse in which environmental policy is 
presently situated. This, of course, theoretically means that the pendulum may 
also swing back to administrative regulation. However, given the general ten­
dency towards recognising the limits of regulation, it is not very probable 
that self-commitments will fall into disgrace in the foreseeable future, pro­
vided they can demonstrate an adequate degree of effectiveness as compared 
to administrative regulation on the one hand, market-based instruments on the 
other.
Among the more recent self-commitments, the declaration of the German 
Industry on protection of global climate of 1995, as amended and expanded in 
199623, is of particular importance. It is seen as a test case for the effective­
ness and acceptability of self-commitments as an instrument of environmental 
policy in lieu of command-and-control regulation. The original declaration 
contained a commitment of the German industry to reduce the specific CO2 
emissions or specific energy consumption (i.e. emissions or energy per pro­
duction unit) by 20 % by the year 2005, the base year being 1987; the 
amended declaration stiffens this commitment by choosing the year 1990 as 
base year, which means that most “windfall profits” in emission reductions 
from plant closures after the German reunification can no longer be credited. 
Moreover, in addition to the originally 15 industrial sectors, 4 new sectors 
joined the declaration. The new declaration contains a rather detailed and 
complex monitoring system which is supervised by an independent economic 
research institute. It is provided that the data generated shall also be made 
public.
The declaration is an “umbrella” declaration which is concretised by 19 
individual self-commitments of various sectoral associations which describe 
the reduction potential and promise to take the best technical efforts to fully 
use this potential, in the second declaration also report on previous progress 
and indicate further measures envisaged. The whole system accounts for 
about 70 % of industrial energy consumption and close to 100 % of public 
electricity supply; moreover, due to the participation of the associations of the 
German gas and electricity supply industry and the municipal enterprises, it 23
23 See Erkliirung der deutschen Wirtschaft zur Klimavorsorge, 1996 Umwelt 193-195; 
Selbstverpflichtungserklarung der Wirtschaft - Ein wichtiger Baustein des Klimas- 
chutzprogram m s, 1997 Umwelt 102-104; K. Rennings et al., N achhaltigkeit, 
Ordnungspolitik undfreiwillige Selbstverpflichtung, 1996, p. 203-219; for an appraisal 
of an advanced draft of the CO2 self-commitment see M. Kohlhaas, B. Praetorius et al., 




























































































indirectly comprises most households and small commercial consumers. Most 
self-commitments indicate quantitative targets which may be below, or be­
yond the general target of 20 %. Moreover, in contrast to the 1995 declara­
tion, individual self-commitments do not only promise the reduction of spe­
cific CO2 emissions or the increase of specific energy efficiency; there are 15 
commitments that are also couched in absolute terms.
The origin of the CO2 self-commitment was the desire of the German gov­
ernment to have something to present to the Berlin Conference that demon­
strated the firm will of Germany to comply with its unilateral commitment of 
reducing CO2 emissions by 25 % by 2005. Since both the introduction of a 
CO2 and/or energy tax and the promulgation of the regulation for the reuti­
lization of excess process heat mandated by the Federal Emission Control Act 
were very controversial, the self-commitment was seen as a compromise.
In the view of industry, the self-commitment presents important efficiency 
gains, its major advantage being the possibility of differentiating the respec­
tive commitments of the various industrial sectors according to their 
(average) cost structure and reduction/saving potential. It is argued that 
administrative regulation as well as environmental taxes would lead to 
uniform - or at least less differentiated - requirements or effects. However, 
there also is much criticism of the CO2 self-commitment. This criticism is 
mainly predicated on two grounds: that the obligations assumed by industry 
are soft, not really voluntary and contrary to the postulates of a market 
economy and that industry only promised CO2 emission reductions and 
energy savings that, considering the past development, will occur even 
without the self-commitment24.





























































































1. The problem of appropriate evaluation criteria
The assessment of environmental agreements has always been controversial 
and their increasing use in the recent past is seen by many not as a sign of the 
growing need for a flexible environmental policy that is considerate for the 
needs of the affected industry, but, rather, as a sign of regulatory weakness of 
the state.
The primary problem of an economic evaluation of contractual techniques 
is the development of an adequate reference system for comparing environ­
mental agreements on the one hand, and administrative and economic regula­
tion on the other. Of course, the economic theory of regulation has developed 
a set of criteria for assessing different instruments for implementing envi­
ronmental policy, such as environmental effectiveness, (static) efficiency, im­
pact on innovation (dynamic efficiency), consistency with the fundamental 
decision for a market economy, constitutionality, administrative feasibility, 
and distributional fairness25. The problem is how to make the comparison. In 
this respect, the orientation of economic theory at models seems to cause 
some methodological difficulties. The reference system of evaluation cannot 
be an idealized configuration of traditional or economic regulation, but, 
rather, the configuration that would have existed if normal procedures had 
been followed for introducing administrative regulation or economic instru­
ments. It is not appropriate to compare a realistic contractual configuration 
with an idealized regulatory one26. Seen in this perspective, many of the eco­
nomic arguments sustained against environmental agreements are less con­
vincing so long as it cannot be shown that under the circumstances of the par­
ticular case administrative or economic regulation would have rendered a 
better result in relation to baseline emissions, the reduction potential and pos­
sible consumption of improvements by growth. Thus, it appears methodologi­
cally incorrect to take it for granted that the stringency of administrative 
regulation or economic instruments merely envisaged in a draft or project of 
the executive can serve as a standard for assessing an environmental agree­
ment that is substituted for it. This is especially true where the targets and 25
25 See, e.g. D. Cansier, Umweltokonomie, 2nd ed. 1996, at 152; A. Endres, Umweltoko- 
nomie, 1994, at 100-101 with further references.
25 This is largely done by K. Rennings et al., supra note 23, see, e.g., at 90-91, 101-102, 
150-151, 161, 166, 211, 219, 224-225; B. Kohlhaas & M. Praetorius, supra note 23, 




























































































design of administrative or economic regulation are politically very contro­
versial, which often is the case where ultimately environmental agreements 
are concluded. Conversely, environmental agreements that merely supplement 
or stiffen existing administrative regulation should not automatically be con­
sidered as positive. It could well be that the existence of, or the negotiation 
on, an environmental agreement precludes the adoption of more stringent 
regulation. As far as I can see, generally applicable standards of comparison 
have not yet been developed. It is submitted that for the time being compar­
isons can only be made on a case-by-case basis using best professional judge­
ment. This pragmatic modesty appears superior to the somewhat agnostic 
proposition to renounce to any substantive criteria and only ensure adequate 
procedures, the more so since the fundamental question of tertium compara- 
tionis cannot be really avoided by this way out.
This qualification does not apply to economic negotiation theory insofar as 
it analyses and/or predicts the outcome of negotiations on administrative 
regulation and environmental agreements based on the economic interests of 
the main players. Law and political science also have an easier task since they 
conceive the “real world” as the object of their research, either based on a set 
of fundamental values such as state of law, justice and procedural fairness 
(law) or applying criteria that aim at evaluating the functioning of decision­
making systems (political science).
2. Stakeholder views
One of the main purposes of the empirical investigation already men- 
tioned27 was to learn more about the views of the main stakeholders - indus­
try, public authorities and environmental associations - as to the pros and cons 
of environmental agreements. On the basis of the - somewhat divergent - an­
swers to the questionnaires on the one hand and the interviews conducted on 
the other, one can say that both industry and public authorities are generally 
in favour of concluding agreements, while environmental associations are 
more reserved, however without rejecting them entirely.
Industry attaches greater importance to incentives produced by environ­
mental agreements, while public authorities tend to emphasise barriers. Indus­
try sees the benefits and incentives of environmental agreements in efficiency 
gains, the possibility of practical solutions, avoidance of regulation, partner-




























































































ship, flexibility, a say in policy making, competitive gains, reduced operating 
costs and quick implementation. The public authorities emphasize partnership, 
efficiency gains and competitive gains of industry. As for barriers to reliance 
on environmental agreements, industry attaches the greatest importance to the 
regulatory tradition, resistence to institutional innovation and a negative pub­
lic perception, while public authorities emphasize a poor industry compliance 
record, the lack of power of sectoral associations over their members, the 
heterogeneous composition of a particular sector of industry, an excessive 
cost burden and negative public perception. Both groups consider distortion 
of competition, i.e. competitive advantages of foreign firms, as an important 
barrier. As for incentives offered to public authorities to enter into environ­
mental agreements, both groups stress the importance of an improved envi­
ronmental performance in long-term, improved relations and advantages in 
implementation. However, there is quite some disagreement about the func­
tion of environmental agreements to promote the development and dispersion 
of new technology, public authorities being optimistic, industry being more 
reserved.
Environmental associations28 are primarily concerned about a loss of 
democratic rights caused by increasing reliance on environmental agreements; 
they stress the need for accountability, which amounts to the demand for 
binding agreements and sanctions built into the agreement, transparency and 
involvement of the civil society. Associations also fear that the negotiation 
process may be used to water or postpone regulation. Generally they believe 
that economic interests will be accorded priority and the result of contractual 
methods may be a stagnation of environmental policy. Therefore they want to 
limit the contractual approach to supplementing existing regulation or preced­
ing future one rather than using agreements as a substitute for regulation. On 
the other hand, they recognise that environmental agreements entail important 
benefits, especially the possibility of using the knowledge of industry for de­
vising tailored solutions and for anticipating regulation on an experimental 
basis.
When comparing the results of the different member states, the Dutch re­
sponses indicate a higher appreciation of the benefits and incentives offered 
by agreements than do those of the average. This could indicate both the suc­
cess of Dutch agreements and their perceived legitimacy as an instrument of 
environmental policy resulting from the accepted social learning model of 28
28 Apart from the study supra note 11 see J. Biekart, supra note 18, at 144-148; R. Gerrits 




























































































Dutch environmental policy. In any case, inspite of the novelty of the contrac­
tual method there seems to exist a basic consensus that under appropriate 
conditions it is an acceptable instrument of environmental policy.
3. Argum ents
a) Environmental effectiveness
From an environmental policy perspective, the environmental effectiveness 
of agreements is paramount. It has two aspects. One is the degree of strin­
gency of the agreement itself in relation to baseline emissions, the reduction 
potential and possible consumption of improvements by growth, the other is 
the performance of the parties and hence the success or failure of the 
agreement.
It is commonly held that there are a number of prerequisites for the con­
clusion of sufficiently stringent environmental agreements and their environ­
mental success. These prerequisites substantially limit the applicability of 
contractual techniques, although these factors are not absolute, but relative 
and not necessarily cumulative: There must be a certain tradition of, and ex­
perience with, joint problem-solving; industry and distributors must not ex­
pect considerable disadvantages (costs, competitive disadvantages, loss of 
turnover) as a consequence of the agreement; there must be a certain homo­
geneity on the part of the committed industry and all major industrial and 
commercial stakeholders must participate; there must be fairly uniform atti­
tudes in the public as to the assessment of the environmental problem to be 
solved by the agreement; there must be clear and concrete environmental tar­
gets; and the agency must dispose of a credible threatening potential, which 
means that in case of lack of consensus or compliance with the agreement the 
adoption of more disadvantageous administrative or economic regulation 
must be probable29.
As regards stringency of the requirements provided by the agreement, it is 
argued that in order to prevent business-as-usual strategies and watering of 
environmental targets as well as maintain the political responsibility of the 
democratic institutions, agreements should only be accepted where they pre- 29
29 Cf. P. Winsemius, “Environmental Contracts and Covenants: New Instruments for a 
Realistic Environmental Policy?”, in: J. van Dunnd, supra note 18, p. 5-15; 1993 Envi­




























































































cede the entering into force of regulation or supplement (concretise or 
stiffen) it; substitution for regulation should be rejected. To a certain extent 
this argument is supported by the assumption of negotiation theory that nego­
tiation on objectives is more difficult than that on means to implement given 
objectives30. However, this line of reasoning should not be followed. First of 
all the delimitation of substitution and concrétisation is rather teneous where 
one deals with broad statutory terms. It has little to do with the political 
weight of the matter and the interest configuration involved. Also, the notion 
of regulation soon becomes unclear where one asks the question as to whether 
political targets, parliamentary statutes or only decrees of the executive qual­
ify as regulation. Finally, there are situations of high complexity associated 
with great regulatory risk and high coordination costs, e.g., energy saving or 
recycling of product-related waste, where substitution of agreements for 
regulation appears appropriates 1.
It is true that the theoretical consequence of bargaining is that the state 
must pay, e.g. by a lessening of the desirable level of environmental protec­
tion or by promising a standstill of regulation in the foreseeable future. Thus, 
the German CO2 self-commitment is criticised because it aims at lower en­
ergy savings than demanded by the Federal Executive and achieved on the av­
erage of the last decades as a consequence of economic change32. However, 
administrative regulation also entails elements of bargaining33. One should 
not take it for granted that a mere prolongation of energy saving trends from 
the past to the future already represents a valid prognosis (although these 
trends have at least an indicative value). A recent analysis shows that the en­
ergy savings that will probably be achieved by the self-commitment are 
larger than those associated with the envisaged administrative regulation or 
CO2 taxes, although a combination of the latter would be superior but amount 
to very stringent regulation34. Moreover, the drawback of “watering” envi­
ronmental policy targets may be offset by the advantage that a (prompt) solu- 30124
30 M. Glachand, “Voluntary Agreements in Environmental Policy”, OECD 1994, at 10-11 
(not published).
31 European Commission, COM (96) 561 final, at No. 15; International Energy Agency, 
Voluntary Actions for Emission-related CO2 Abatement, OECD 1997, at 62-63.
32 See K. Rennings et al., supra note 23, at 209-210, 213.
33 J. Hucke, “Bargaining in regulative policy implementation: the case of air and water pol­
lution control”, 4 Envt’l Pol. & Law, 109-115 (1978); A. Endres & M. Finus, “Zur 
Neuen Politischen Okonomie der Umweltgesetzgebung - Umweltschutzinstrumente im 
politischen ProzeB”, 9 Zeitschrift für angewandte Umweltpolitik, Special issue 8, 88- 
103 (1996); E. Gawel, Umweltallokation durch Ordnungsrecht, 1994.
34 B. Hillebrand, J. Wachbauer et al., “Gesamtwirtschaftliche Beurteilung von CO2- 




























































































tion of the problem is at all possible. Furthermore, due to the acceptance by 
the most directly affected firms, there may be less compliance problems. This 
advantage of self-regulation is of a psychological nature. Where industry de­
velops solutions through self-commitments it will later on have to comply 
with self-created, rather than heteronomous rules; this increases the degree of 
compliance. However, this requires participation of virtually all affected 
members of the relevant branch of industry which is not always ensured, for 
example because small and medium-sized firms are not sufficiently repre­
sented in the industrial association.
Finally, the formulation of industry’s obligations in an agreement may be 
an important factor for ensuring a sufficient stringency. Quantified, absolute 
and detailed obligations are in this respect superior to mere duties to reduce 
relative (specific) emissions (emissions per product unit) or take best efforts 
which may be consumed by growth35.
It is safe to say that in many European countries some environmental 
agreements concluded so far have ultimately failed. However, there are more 
examples of quite successful agreements36. Reasons for the failure of agree­
ments have been the great heterogeneity of the participants (e.g. in case of 
packagings), an inadequate delimitation of the scope of the agreement (e.g. 
non-inclusion of all important competitors or industrial users of a product), 
the lack of acceptance of environmentally friendly products by users, lack of 
substitutes, or the collapse of the calculatory basis of participants due to later 
developments.
The evidence does not support the argument that self-commitments are 
doomed to failure because they are not enforceable. However, this is exactly 
what is sustained by such diverse actors as the European Commission, many 
authors and environmental associations37. A binding contract equipped with 3*7
33 European Commission, COM (96) 561 final, at Nos. 20-21; International Energy 
Agency, supra note 31, at 52, 65-66.
36 For the Netherlands see Algemeene Rekenkamer, Convenanten van het Rijk met
bedrijven en instellingen, 1995; J. Biekart, supra note 18, at 143-148; R. van Acht & L.
Damen, EJfectieve toepassing van milieuconvenanten, 1991; E. van Rossum, “Con­
venanten reviserd”, 1993 Environmental Liability Law Review (TMA) 97-102; M. 
Korten, Overzicht van milieuconvenanten, 1997; for Germany see S. Lautenbach, U. 
Steger & P. Weihrauch, in: Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, Freiwillige Koop- 
erationslosungen im Umweltschutz - Ergebnisse eines Gutachtens und Workshops, 
1992; A. Troge, Erfolgs- und Problemfàlle umweltbezogener Selbstverpflichtungen aus 
der Sicht des Vmweltbundesamts, 1997 (unpublished).
37 See European Commission, COM (96) 561 final, at No. 19, but see at No. 11; Ren- 




























































































sanctions in the form of penalties is the regulatory ideal although it has never 
been investigated whether the success rate of such agreements is really higher 
than that of gentlemen’s agreements or self-commitments. It also is an open 
question whether the penalties are really used by the authorities or the state 
simply reacts to non-compliance by adopting regulation. Finally, the fre­
quency of renegotiation and cancellation provisions in binding agreements 
indicates certain weaknesses of the contractual approach.
An alternative is the procedural model of social learning which trusts in 
the strong coercive power of reporting, monitoring and verification, interim 
targets, transparency and institution building (via joint verification and ad­
justment bodies). Consequently, many more recent environmental agreements 
all provide for rather sophisticated monitoring systems; it is thought that the 
interim monitoring results will enable the state to intervene where there is no 
reasonable further progress towards achieving the relevant environmental 
targets.
The question is whether these two models constitute strategic policy options 
or whether the formal model is the more mature one which will be accepted 
everywhere once sufficient experience has been gained with the informal 
method and environmental contracts, have been recognised as in principle be­
ing legitimate. I have some doubts because the formal, somewhat legalistic 
model of reregulation largely equates environmental agreements with negoti­
ated regulation.
b) Efficiency
Industry favours environmental agreements on the ground that they 
achieve efficiency gains as compared to both administrative regulation and 
environmental taxes through their flexibility and consideration of the cost 
structure of the affected sector. Arguably the major advantage of environ­
mental agreements relates more to equitable distribution of regulatory bur­
dens and avoidance of distortive effects on competition (e.g., dislocation of 
energy-intensive industry to low energy-efficiency countries, which would 
run counter to the environmental goal of achieving total net benefits for 
global climate)38. Since, except for the more recent Dutch agreements, the as­
sociation commitments are not formally translated into requirements for indi­
milieu”, in P. Eijlander, P. Gilhuis & J. Peters, Regering en Zelfregulering, 1991, p. 
71-86.




























































































vidual firms, one might assume that part of the alleged efficiency gains 
achieved by agreements differentiated sector by sector will be lost at firm 
level39. However, in developing a proposal for an agreement, the relevant in­
dustry association largely relies on the individual membership firms’ self-as­
sessment of their respective reduction potential. Provided these self-assess­
ments reflect the firms’ marginal costs and the firms, because they have a 
self-interest in the success of the agreement, reduce their emissions accord­
ingly, one cannot rule it out that there are some merits to the efficiency 
argument.
Another efficiency advantage of agreements as compared to market-based 
instruments is the greater possibility for industry to foresee and calculate the 
economic consequences of required reduction of pollution. In particular, in­
dustry does not depend on the varying market price of tradeable permits nor 
does it have to spend money on taxes at the very moment when it would be 
appropriate to use this money for investment in process changes, and industry 
is more flexible as regards the exact timing of environmental investments. 
However, a tiered system of taxation whereby taxes are gradually increased 
and this increase is announced in advance might have similar advantages.
A related argument in favour of agreements is that they grant industry an 
option for self-regulation within the framework of targets set by the state. 
Self-regulation means that industry can shape the design of the relevant rules. 
This is particularly important in areas such as CO2 reduction and energy ef­
ficiency where quite different solutions are possible. Although industry influ­
ence on the design of administrative regulation can also be exerted in the bar­
gaining process as to relevant governmental proposals, the “bargaining” posi­
tion of industry with respect to negotiated self-commitments is better and 
hence their influence on the design of the solution greater. However, eco­
nomic instruments are equivalent in this respect.
c) Innovation
A quite controversial aspect is the relationship of environmental agree­
ments to technological innovation. If one relies on the self-assessment by in­
dustry one must conclude that environmental agreements can only be effective 39
39 K. Rennings et al., supra note 23, at 100, 163, 217; “Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschafts- 
forschung, Selbstverpflichtungen der Wirtschaft zur C02-Reduktion: Kein Ersatz fiir 
aktive Klimapolitik”, 62 DlW-Wochenbericht 277, at 279 (1995); but see M. Glachand, 
supra note 30, at 12; European Commission, COM (96) 561 final, at No. 8; Interna­




























































































when radical technological innovation is not at stake. On the other hand, it 
could be argued that voluntary approaches are especially promising in case of 
technological uncertainties because they give room to social learning. Indeed, 
environmental agreements in the past have led to technological change at least 
where substitutes already were in place or research and development was well 
advanced. The German experience with the voluntary collective recycling 
system for packaging waste established under the umbrella of the German 
Packagings Waste Regulation also indicates that environmental agreements 
may contribute to technological innovation. However, in contrast to environ­
mental taxes, there would not be an ongoing incentive for innovation. To this 
extent, environmental agreements are close to command-and-control regula­
tion as well as tradeable permits^).
d) Conformity with the legal system
The extent to which environmental agreements can be fit in the relevant le­
gal system raises rather complex legal-political and often highly technical le­
gal questions that vary from country to country and also from type to type of 
agreement. However, it is nowhere in Europe that one is prepared to uncon­
ditionally accept the legality and legitimacy of such agreements4!. One may 
object to contractualisation of environmental policy especially on the grounds 
that the state gives away its regulatory prerogatives and thereby its responsi­
bility for safeguarding the public interest, inequality is promoted, there is a 
danger of capture of agencies by industry, participation of the public is ex­
cluded and competition is restricted^.
The two latter aspects are the most important and shall be briefly dealt 
with. Public participation is generally seen as a major prerequisite for pro­
tecting the interests of affected persons, broadening the information basis of 
the executive, achieving a more rational decision and securing public accep- 4012
40 K. Rennings et al., supra note 23, at 100, 216, 218; M. Kohlhaas & B. Praetorius, 
supra note 23, at 177; M. Glachand, supra note 30, at 14.
41 This is even true in the Netherlands where environmental agreements are generally ac­
cepted; see, e.g. P. van Buuren, “Environmental Covenants; Possibilities and Impossi­
bilities”, in: J. van Dunné (ed.), supra note 18, p. 49-55; N. Koeman, supra note 18, at 
183-184; I. Koppen, supra note 18, at 166-167 with further references.
42 See, e.g., G. Winter, “Bartering Rationality in Regulation”, 19 Law and Society 
Review  219-250 (1985); W. Rengeling, supra note 4, at 70-71; A. Rest, “The 
Integration of Environmental Covenants and Contracts in the Public Law System”, in: J. 
van Dunné, supra note 18, p. 225-230; E. Basse, “The Contract Model - The Merits of a 
Voluntary Approach”, 2 Envt'l Liability 74, at 81-82 (1994); C.-A. Morand, “La 
contractualisation corporatiste de la formation et la mise en oeuvre du droit”, in: id. 




























































































tance. In most countries, agreements are negotiated behind closed doors with 
virtually no public participation, except for isolated press coverage accompa­
nying some more controversial negotiations. To the extent that the executive 
assumes a major role in the process by initiating and concluding formal 
agreements or recognising self-commitments, it is arguable that this amounts 
to a circumvention of the participation requirements for agency decision­
making.
A universally accepted remedy to the malaise is not in sight. Granting the 
public the right to participate in the negotiation, for example the right to 
comment on an advanced draft of the agreement, sit at the negotiation table or 
even have to give its consent, might impede the success of negotiation. There­
fore, it is not amazing that environmental associations who tend to associate 
environmental agreements with a reduction of democratic rights are split as 
to the question of participation in the negotiation process; of course, this also 
is due to manpower problems and a reluctance to assume joint responsibility 
with industry for the results of the negotiation. The Dutch example shows that 
in a consensus-oriented society public participation in the negotiation process 
can function. However even there one finds examples where, for lack of a 
constructive consensus, environmental associations were excluded from the 
final stage of the negotiation's. This indicates that the participatory model at 
least has its limitations. An alternative solution for the problem might have to 
be sought in ex-post controls, e.g. extensive transparence and public partici­
pation in monitoring the achievements of the particular agreement. The 
strong emphasis laid recently on monitoring and transparence of the perfor­
mance of environmental agreements goes in this direction. The interests of 
non-participating persons such as suppliers and consumers could then be safe­
guarded by antitrust enforcement.
Environmental agreements may be associated with restraints of competition 
where they fix prices, establish pools for collecting and recovering product- 
related waste, decide on the introduction of new products, or hamper innova­
tion competition. It also is possible that environmental agreements serve as a 
shield for participating firms to concert their action with respect to market 
parameters unrelated to the object of the agreement. Finally, especially the 
recycling agreements may promote concentration of markets for collection 
and recovery of waste materials. In the practice of the German and European 
antitrust authorities, there has been a certain tendency to exempt environmen­
t s  See R. Gents & J. Hinssen, supra note 18, at 327, 328; furthermore authors cited supra 




























































































tal agreements -except for price-related agreements and (to a lesser extent) 
agreements that preclude access to the market - from the scope of application 
of antitrust laws, on the grounds that the adverse impact on competition was 
not appreciable or the agreement was on balance beneficial and therefore 
could be tolerated or formally permitted44 45. Whatever the merits of this per­
missive balancing approach in individual cases, it is safe to say that the prob­
lem of adverse effects on competition can and should be tackled by antitrust 
enforcement. The discongruence between the mission of antitrust authorities 
to protect competition and the need for integrating environmental concerns 
into competition policy has as yet not caused major problems, although espe­
cially in Germany one has experienced some tensions. Since most cases do not 
involve “high politics”, an elevation of decision-making powers to the full 
cabinet would not be appropriate, unless this organisational structure already 
exists for other reasons, such as in the EC relating to formal exemptions.
Of course, an orthodox antitrust philosophy that does not accept that there 
may be “reasonable” restraints of competition for the sake of environmental 
protection, would be the death of environmental agreements. Indeed, one of 
the main arguments of German critics who adhere to the concept of 
“Ordnungspolitik” (quasi-constitutional character of the “fundamental” deci­
sion for a market economy) against environmental agreements is their princi­
pal lack of conformity with the postulates of a market system45. This system 
is said to be constituted by competition occurring within the framework 
conditions (in our context: environmental framework conditions) to be set by 
the state rather than private ordering. In this view environmental agreements 
are a “fall” to which all alternative instruments that are not associated with
44 See, e.g. European Commission, 22nd Report on Competition Policy, 1992, Nos. 77, 
179; 23rd Report on Competition Policy, 1993, Nos. 168, 169, 240; 25th Report on 
Competition Policy, 1995, No. 85; M. Bock, “Entsorgung von Verkaufsverpackungen 
und Kartellrecht”, 46 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 187-203 (1996); A. Riesenkampf, 
“Die private Abfallentsorgung und das Kartellrecht”, 50 Der Betriebs-Berater 933-940 
(1995); L. Kramer, “Die Integrierung umweltpolitischer Erfordemisse in die euro- 
paische Wettbewerbspolitik”, in: W. Rengeling (ed.), Umweltschutz und andere Politi- 
ken der Europaischen Gemeinschaft, 1993, p. 47, at 56-58; R. Jacobs, “EEC Competi­
tion Law and the Protection of the Environment”, 1993 Legal Issues o f European Inte­
gration 37, at 52-58; T. Portwood, Competition Law and the Environment, 1994; L. 
Gyselen, ‘The Emerging Interface between Competition Policy and Environmental Pol­
icy in the EC”, in D. Cameron, P. Demaret & D. Geradin (eds.). Trade and Environ­
ment - The Search for Balance, 1994, p. 242, at 250-257.
45 K. Rennings et al., supra note 23, at 96, 159, 175, 189-191; G. Maier-Rigaud, “Fur 
eine okologische Wirtschaftsordnung”, 1996 Jahrbuch Okologie 71-79; M. Kohlhaas & 




























































































restriction of competition, even administrative regulation, should be 
preferred.
e) Environmental agreements and the political system
Under the perspective of political science the trends towards contractuali­
sation of environmental policy seem to conform with the analysis of the 
structural change of the modern state from hierarchy to dehierarchised policy 
networks^. What tends to spoil the classification of environmental agree­
ments, though, is the predominantly bilateral character of negotiations in 
most European countries. This adds a certain neocorporatist element^. How­
ever, environmental contracting is not an emanation of a stable, exclusive re­
lationship between the state and a single powerful industrial association. It is 
rather based on an ad-hoc selection of suitable negotiation partners. More­
over, the recent efforts at improving transparency of agreements and espe­
cially of monitoring results lead to a certain opening to the public at large, 
especially environmental associations. It is another question whether a 
stronger public participation in the negotiation process is desirable for in­
creasing the rationality of decision-making, especially safeguarding the inter­
ests of affected segments of the population such as suppliers, consumers and 
workers, and fostering the general interest in environmental protection.
46 See supra notes 5 and 6.
47 In this sense H. Weidner, Umweltkooperation und alternative Konfliktregelungsver- 
fahren in Deutschland, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, FS II 96-302, 





























































































IV. Legalization of environmental agreements?
The uncertain status of environmental agreements in the legal system as 
well as the lack of guidance regarding the minimum contents and the proce­
dure to be followed in negotiating such agreements suggest that some general 
rules in this respect might be desirable.
Denmark and Belgium (Flanders) have made the unique attempt at for­
mally integrating consensual techniques at the level of target setting and im­
plementation into their legal order. Art. 10 and 11 of the Danish Environ­
mental Protection Act of 199348 and the Flemish Decree on Environmental 
Covenants of 199449  provide for formal authority for the conclusion of such 
agreements, their relationship to existing or future regulation, their binding 
force, the entities bound, the (possible) sanctions in case of violation as well 
as procedural rules; in particular, interested public bodies as well as envi­
ronmental organisations and in Flanders also other members of the public at 
large have an opportunity to comment on the draft agreement. This solves a 
number of controversial legal issues in the debate. However, the practice 
seems to indicate that industry continues to prefer informal agreements 
which, in turn, raises the question whether “formalisation of informality” is 
not so contradictory in itself that it amounts to the quadrature of the circle.
The Flemish example shows that it is problematic to guard against defi­
ciencies of environmental agreements through the adoption of restrictive 
regulation that somehow equates these agreements with normal administrative 
regulation. This is in particular true of the procedural requirements that do 
not only expose the negotiation process to publicity and participation by the 
public at large, but also entitle important advisory bodies such as the Council 
on Environment and Nature to comment on the draft and grant the Flemish 
Parliament a veto right; consequently, the agreement must be published in the 
official journal. In Denmark especially the binding force of “statutory”
48 See E. Basse, supra note 42, at 79-84; id., “Environmental Contracts: A New Instru­
ment to be used in the Danish Regulation of Environmental Law”, in J. van Dunnd 
(ed.), supra note 18, p. 197-224; J. Jorgensen, “Legislation on ‘Eco-Contracts’ in 
Denmark”, in: J. van Dunnd (ed.), supra note 18, p. 73-85. Both authors reprint the rel­
evant sections of the Danish Environmental Protection Act.
49 Decree No. 94-1787, O.J. o f 8 July 1994, p. 180; for the draft see H. Bocken, 
“Covenants in Belgian Environmental Law - Remarks on the Draft Decree on Environ­
mental Covenants” , in J. van Dunnd, supra note 18, p. 57-71; H. Bocken & D. 
Ryckbost (ed.), Codification o f Environmental Law - Draft Decree on Environmental 




























































































agreements is not accepted by industry. Moreover, except for one case where 
a serious freerider problem existed and industry was interested in having it 
solved (lead batteries), the freerider provision whereby also firms that do not 
participate in the agreement are under certain circumstances bound by it has 
deterred industry from using the new law.
By contrast, more flexible approaches such as those used in Portugal 
(limited to compliance agreements) and the Netherlands seem to function 
better. In Portugal, industry and the competent ministries signed a protocol of 
understanding whereby firms that do not adhere to an environmental agree­
ment are required to strictly conform to environmental regulations and, un­
like signatory firms, are neither granted delays for compliance nor financial 
assistance. The Netherlands rejected the idea of general legislation because it 
was felt that the advantages of the contractual model - flexibility and freedom 
as to procedure and content - would be lost. Instead the Netherlands adopted a 
provisional code of conduct which contains recommended criteria for the 
contents of environmental agreements and the procedure for their negotiation 
and c o n c lu s io n 5 0 . in Portugal, 8  agreements have been concluded on the basis 
of the Protocol; in the Netherlands, the number is 12.
This also is the method followed by the European Commission in its Com­
munication and its Recommendation on environmental agreements. However, 
it should be noted that the flexibility of the method - instead of mandatory 
regulation mere indicative criteria - does not necessarily mean that the crite­
ria as such are acceptable. In this respect, as already stated the European 
Commission’s insistence on binding contracts and its preference even for 
outright sanctions appears problematic.
50 See also the Guidelines o f the Prime Minister (Ministry of General Affairs) for the con­
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